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Este artigo investiga a resposta da oferta de trabalho a mudanças na alíquota de
imposto de renda levando em consideração transferências combinadas de
moeda em espécie e bens físicos. É E demonstrado que, sob certas hipóteses:
lazer e transferências de bens físicos são complementares, lazer é um bem
normal, e o montante adquirido do bem físico pode ser complementado - uma
redução na alíquota do imposto de renda leva, sem ambiguidade, a um aumento
da quantidade ofertada de trabalho se ocorrer um acréscimo concomitante na
provisão do bem público. Ainda, mostra-se que isto causa um efeito negativo
sobre a utilidade dos agentes. Estes resultados generalizam o debate entre
Gwartney e Stroup (1983) e Gahvari (1986, 1990) e qualificam o papel das
transferências em moeda e em bens físicos como instrumentos complementares
para balancear o orçamento do governo após uma mudança na alíquota do
imposto de renda.
Palavras-chave: oferta de trabalho, alíquota de imposto e transferências
combinadas de moeda em espécie, bens físicos.
Abstract
This paper investigates labor supply response to tax rates changes taking into
consideration cash-cum-in-kind transfers as a redistributive package. It
demonstrates that under the standard assumptions: in-kind transfers and leisure
are Hicks substitutes, leisure is normal, and in-kind transfer can be “topped up”
- a marginal income tax cut unambigously increases the quantity supplied of
labor if there is a concomitant increase in the public good provision. In
addition, that causes a negative effect on utility. These results generalize the
debate between Gwartney and Stroup (1983) and Gahvari (1986, 1990) and
qualify the role of both cash and in-kind transfer as complementary instruments
to balance the governments budget after a tax rate change.




This paper investigates labor supply response to tax rates changes taking into
consideration cash-cum-in-kind transfers as a redistributive package. It demon-
strates that under the standard assumptions: in-kind transfers and leisure are Hicks
substitutes, leisure is normal, and in-kind transfer can be “topped up“ - a marginal
income tax cut unambigously increases the quantity supplied of labor if there is
a concomitant increase in the public good provision. In addition, that causes a
negative eﬀect on utility. These results generalize the debate between Gwartney
and Stroup (1983) and Gahvari (1986, 1990) and qualify the role of both cash and
in-kind transfer as complementary instruments to balance the governments budget
after a tax rate change.
Resumo
Este artigo investiga a resposta da oferta de trabalho a mudan¸ cas na al´ ıquota de
imposto de renda levando em considera¸ c˜ ao transferˆ encias combinadas de moeda
em esp´ ecie e bens f´ ısicos. ´ E demonstrado que, sob certas hip´ oteses: lazer e
transferˆ encias de bens f´ ısicos s˜ ao complementares, lazer ´ e um bem normal, e o
montante adquirido do bem f´ ısico pode ser complementado - uma redu¸ c˜ ao na
al´ ıquota do imposto de renda leva, sem ambiguidade, a um aumento da quantidade
ofertada de trabalho se ocorrer um acr´ escimo concomitante na provis˜ ao do bem
p´ ublico. Ainda, mostra-se que isto causa um efeito negativo sobre a utilidade dos
agentes. Estes resultados generalizam o debate entre Gwartney e Stroup (1983) e
Gahvari (1986, 1990) e qualiﬁcam o papel das transferˆ encias em moeda e em bens
f´ ısicos como instrumentos complementares para balancear o or¸ camento do governo
ap´ os uma mudan¸ ca na al´ ıquota do imposto de renda.
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1 Introduction
In a recent attempt to stimulate the aggregated labor supply and job growth,
there was an income tax rate cut in U.S. that caused discussions around the world
about its ﬁnal eﬀect in terms of eliminating the recession in that country. The U.S.
president argued in the Tax Cut Bill Signing Ceremony that such a tax cut would
stimulate the economy and create jobs:
Tax relief makes the code more fair for small businesses and farmers
and individuals by eliminating the death tax. Over the long haul,
tax relief will encourage work and innovation... The money we
return, or don’t take in the ﬁrst place, can be saved for a child’s
education, spent on family needs, invested in a home or in a business
or a mutual fund or used to reduce personal debt.
The debate about labor supply response to income taxes changes is old-fashioned
and centralizes the arguments in the general equilibrium eﬀects on the labor supply.
For instance Hausman (1981), presents a standard income-leisure analysis to make
the point clear: lower tax rates increases the net wage that can be earned from an
additional hour of work (substitution eﬀect), but also can keep the same standard
of living with less work (income eﬀect).
However, Gwartney and Stroup (1983) and Ehrenberg and Smith (1985) point
out that this analysis does not take the aggregated labor market into consideration.
The authors argue that a tax cut does not increase aggregate real income by the
amount of the tax reduction. In other words, it does not per se change the technical
production possibilities of the economy. In their general equilibrium model, a tax
cut will generate a decline in the public goods expenditures which in turn, will
oﬀset the expansion in private goods expenses. That eliminates the income eﬀect,
2leaving the unambigously negative (substitution) eﬀect of tax cut on labor supply.
On the other hand, Gahvari (1986) argues that this latter claim only would be
correct if the tax revenues are handed back to indiviudals as cash transfers and
both private and public goods can be bought freely in the market. The author
explains that in the case that a tax cut causes a reduction in the provision of the
public good, then individuals face a constrained market, which in turn forces them
to consume diﬀerent bundles than the ones they would choose if they receive the
value in cash.1
This paper argues that, ﬁrst, if the goverment can hand back cash transfer
to individuals then it could also impose a lump-sum tax instead of using a linear
income tax. That achieves a ﬁrst-best result without excess burden. This result
can be obtained if one allows three instruments on the part of the government such
as cash transfer, linear tax and the provision of public good. Second, the paper
characterizes suﬃcient conditions to obtain an unambigously negative eﬀect of tax
rates on labor supply, generalizing Gahvaris statement. Third, it shows that the
ﬁnal eﬀect on the utility of individuals is undetermined.
The cash-cum-in-kind scheme is ﬁrst described theoretically in Gahvari and
Mattos (2007), however, such redistributive programs have been implemented
in many developing economies.2 Under these packages named Conditional Cash
Transfer (CCT), the recipients are allowed to receive a monthly stipend in addition
to consuming the publicly provided goods suchs as school or health centers. Gahvari
and Mattos (2007) show that CCT mechanism achieve ﬁrst-best redistribution and
can redistribute more than an exclusive public goods provision policy. However,
the authors use a model with exogenous income.
1Gahvari (1986) presents a comparison between Gwartney and Stroups model and a compensated
wage tax eﬀect. Gwartney and Sroup (1986) reply Gahvari’s model arguing that the main point is
still in place, i.e., the standard “income eﬀect” analysis ignores aggregated eﬀects, however the the
unambigous negative eﬀect of tax rates on labor supply is also questioned in Gahvari (1990).
2See Das, Do and Ozler (2004) and Rawlings and Rubio (2004).These programs usually propose
many social objectives such as redistribution, human capital accumulation, and reduction of child
labor supply.
3In contrast, this paper focus on household labor supply response to tax rates
change when conditional cash transfer is introduced, treating family individuals
aggregated a la Becker (1991), i.e., labor supply decisions are made at the house-
hold level. Speciﬁcally, it proves that if in-kind transfers and leisure are Hicks
substitutes, leisure is normal, in-kind transfer is not underprovided, the marginal
tax is not underimposed, then a concomitant increase in the public good provision
together with a marginal income tax cut unambigously increases the quantity
supplied of labor. Using the same assumption above this paper demonstrates that
a marginal tax cut has ambiguous eﬀect on the individuals utility.
2 The model
Consider an economy with n identical individuals. They have preferences over a
private good x, a public good G and leisure, l. Assume, as in Gwartney and Stroup
(1983) and Gahvari (1986), that both goods are produced using only labor L through
linear technologies. That guarantees the relative prices of x, G and l are ﬁxed. The
private good x is produced in the market, but the public good G is ﬁnanced through
a linear income tax θ combined with a cash transfer, s3. The last can be positive
(lum-sum tax) or negative (rebate) and is provided to all individuals as long as
they consume the public good4. The government budget constraint can be written as
npG + ns = nθw(1 − l) (1)
where p is the individual price of G, and each individuals labor endownment is set
equal to 1. The following deﬁnition is important at this stage,5
Deﬁnition 1 Good G is said to be overprovided if, if in comparison to his current
position, the transfer recipient strictly prefers an oﬀer of one dollar cut in his amount
of in-kind transfers, coupled with a one dollar increase in his cash grants. Otherwise,
g is not overprovided.
3This paper diﬀerentiates from Gahvari (1990) because both instruments s and G are allowed
to be complementary and not substitutes instruments to compensate variations in θ.
4As in Gahvari (1986), the consumer is not allowed to sell the public good which makes its
consumption mandatory as well as the cash transfer.
5This deﬁnition is usual in the literature, see Gahvari (1994, 1995).
4Given the deﬁnition above, one can concentrate in the case that g is overprovided.
If g is not overprovided then the agents can buy additional (or zero) units of that
good and that is not going to aﬀect their labor supply decision. Further, assume
that 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.6
The consumer treats s as ﬁxed and maximize utility subject to g = g and the
budget constraint,
x = w(1 − θ)(1 − l) + s (2)
The ﬁrst order condition can be written as7
ul
ux
= w(1 − θ) (3)
where subscripts of u denote partial derivatives. Both equations 2 and 3 determine
the demand functions l = l(p,g,w(1−θ),s) and x = x(p,g,w(1−θ),s). Substituting
these functions into the utility function gives,
u∗ = v(w(1 − θ),g,s) = u(x(g,w(1 − θ),s),l(g,w(1 − θ),s),g) (4)
In addition, the compensated (constrained) demand for leisure, lc may be derived
from the dual to the constrained utility maximization derived above.
l(g,w(1 − θ),s) ≡ lc(g,w(1 − θ),v(w(1 − θ),g,s)) (5)
For later reference it is useful to present the following result derived in Gahvari
(1994) (see his Lemma 1, p. 499).
Lemma 1 If g and l are Hicks substitutes, then (∂lc/∂g > 0).
The main result of the paper demonstrates the conditions under which one can have
a unambigously negative eﬀect of the tax rate on the labor supply. This is formally
stated and proved below.
6This assumption can be easily relaxed.
7It is plain here that the government prefers to use lump-sum tax instead of wage tax. However,
the paper shows that the combination of both taxes might induce interesting behavior of the
individuals which are the object of this analysis.
5Proposition 1 Assume g and l are Hicks substitutes, leisure is normal, g is not
underprovided, then a marginal income tax cut unambigously increases the quantity
supplied of labor if there is a concomitant increase in the public good provision.

















Next, diﬀerentiate the governments budget constraint with respect to θ allowing for





















































Given the normality of leisure (∂l/∂s) > 0, the denominator is positive which
implies that the sign of expression (9) depends on the numerator. Using Roys
identity, one can ﬁnd |(∂v/∂θ)| = |w(1 − l)∂v/∂s|. Note that when g is overpro-
vided, the marginal utility of the last dollar spent by public provision of g is less
or equal to the marginal utility of cash which leads to (1/p)(∂v/∂g) < (∂v/∂s),
otherwise these terms are equal.8 It is clear then that if (i) l and g are Hicks
substitutes (∂lc/∂g < 0), (ii) normality of leisure (∂l/∂s > 0), (iii) g can be topped
up (∂v/∂g/(∂v/∂s) ≤ p and (iv) the government allows a concomitant movement
in the opposite direction of the public provision of g in relation to θ ((dg/dθ) < 0)
are suﬃcent to ensure that equation (9) is positive.
8Remember that individuals can top up the amount of g in the case that the governments
underprovide them.
6This suggests that an increase in the net wage (decrease in the tax rate)
must be reinforced by a boost in the provision of the public good, in addition to
assumptions (i)-(iii), to guarantee the unambigously increase in the labor supply.
That qualiﬁes the argument proposed in Gahvari (1986) that poses the problem
with Gwartney and Stroup’s model as a ’change in the provision of public goods
is not identical to a change in the individuals purchasing power’ (p.281). With an
additional instrumet to ﬁnance the movement in the tax rate, the government can
redirect the labor supply decision of the agents. In particular, one has to have a
tax cut followed by an increase in the provision of the public good to obtain an
uanmbigously negative response of the labor supply. 9
A second natural question that raises from this analysis concerns the eﬀect on
the utility after a tax rate cut and negative eﬀect on the labor supply (of course,
under the assumptions above)10. The proposition below summarizes the result.
Proposition 2 Assume g and l are Hicks substitutes, leisure is normal, g is not
underprovided, then the eﬀect of a tax cut on the utility is undetermined.









































Similarly than equation (9), the ﬁrst term is negative while the last one is negative
which proves the statement.
The ﬁrst term in the brackets stablishes the substitution component aﬀecting
leisure. This term captures the negative substitution eﬀect of a tax change, which
causes a higher excess burden. The second bracket characterizes the composition
eﬀect which addresses how the new marginal tax rate is going to be ﬁnanced:
9The income eﬀect disapears if dg/dθ = 0.
10Gwartney and Stroup (1986) argues that the analysis in Gahvari (1986) ignores utility eﬀects
of tax revenues.
7either through public good provision or lump-sum rebate. It is positive due to the
assumptions above, which means that composition eﬀect increases utility.
3 Conclusion
This paper investigates labor supply response to tax rates changes taking into
consideration cash-cum-in-kind transfers as a redistributive package. It demon-
strates that under the following assumptions: in-kind transfers and leisure are Hicks
substitutes, leisure is normal, in-kind transfer can be “topped up“ - a marginal
income tax cut unambigously increases the quantity supplied of labor if there is a
concomitant increase in the public good provision.
In particular, the model assumes that the tax rate and the government good are
independent instruments, with cash rebates being adjuted to keep the government
budget in balance. This means a tax increase can go hand-in-hand with an increase
in goverment goods, as well as a decrease in government goods which will then have
diﬀerent impacts on labor supply. Other results may also be generated by tretating
cash as one of independet instrumenets and allowing provision of government goods
to keep the governments budget constraint in balance.
The paper also characterizes the ambigous eﬀect on individuals utitilty even
when labor supply is aﬀected unambigously by the tax rate. That leads to the
argument that even a reduction in tax rate has unpredicted conclusions about social
welfare.
Last, these results put in perspective the debate between Gwartney and Stroup
(1983) and Gahvari (1986, 1990) on labor supply response due to tax rate change and
qualify the role of both cash and in-kind transfer as a complementary instruments
to balance the governments budget after a tax rate change.
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